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ABSTRACT
A three-person field team devoted four days to gathering data
in Andover, Kansas, after a tornado devastated the Golden Spur
Mobil Home Park on April 26, 1991. The research focus was to
assess the extent to which the media's reporting of the local
emergency management team's response to the disaster influenced the
team's subsequent decisions. The researchers functioned as
participant observers in the Emergency Operating Center (EOC),
informally interviewed principal EOC members and media personnel,
and obtained copies of media news stories (television and
newspaper) which reported on the organizational response to the
disaster. An assessment of the observation and interview data as
well as the content analysis of the news stories, suggests that the
EOC team devoted a considerable portion of their time to responding
to the negative press they received centering around two issues:
pre-impact warning and post-impact debris clearance. Some of the
media's news stories sought to engage in blame assignation. The
EOC members devoted time to developing strategies to control the
media damage and changed some decisions they had made in response
to the media's criticism. The relevant disaster research
literature is utilized to explain the response of the EOC personnel
and the media.
HAZARD HOUSE COP'Y
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THE IMPACT OF MEDIA BLAME ASSIGNATION ON THE EOC RESPONSE TO
DISASTER
A Case study of the Response to the April 26, 1991
Andover (Kansas) Tornado
What would Dorothy have found if she had returned home to the
Golden Spur Mobil Home Park on Friday, April 26, 1991? The answer
depends on the time of day. If she had arrived at 6:00 p.m., she
would have found a calm, normal time life style being followed by
the residents. If she had arrived after 6:39 p.m., she would have
been confronted by the horror of what looked like a reenactment of
the bombing of Hiroshima.
The Event
On Friday, April 26, 1991, the work week was ending, the
community's children and their parents were looking forward to the
weekend. For the residents of Andover, however, this would NOT be
a normal weekend. Thirteen lives would end, 175 others would be
injured, 840 individuals would lose their homes, and $7 million
damage would be sustained by a Kansas community of 4,047 before the
day was over.
The Golden Spur Mobile Home Park is located just east of one
of the main traffic arteries leading into the central business
district of Andover, a suburb of Wichita. The park had contained
241 mobile homes housing approximately 1,000 people. The residents
represented a cross-section of the citizens of Andover:
4
newly-
weds, singles, ,young families, middle-aged couples, retirees, a~d
so forth. The town's police chief numbered among the residents of
the mobile home community . The city government offices are housed
in a building approximately one mile north of the park. The
central business district of the community is located approximately
two miles north of the Golden Spur.
On the evening of Friday, April 26, some residents of the
Golden Spur were not yet home from work, others had gone out for
dinner or to run errands, many others were at home. By 6:00 p.m.,
the tornado watch had become a warning. Local radio and television
stations broadcast this warning for the Wichita/Andover area.
Unfortunately, numerous residents did not have their radio or
television turned on when these warnings were being broadcast.
Many people had no idea a tornado was approaching their community.
To make matters worse, the neighborhood "civil defense II siren which
was supposed to sound the warning, apparently did not work when it
was activated. Furthermore, when a local police officer tried to
give one last warning to the park residents by driving up and down
the streets of the Golden Spur sounding his police car siren just
minutes before impact, thereby risking his own life, many residents
did not know (or did not remember) that such police action during
a storm is a warning to take shelter.
At approximately 6:39 p.m. on Friday, April 26, 1991, a
tornado did impact the Golden Spur trailer park destroying
virtually every trailer in the park. Thirteen people died, 175
were injured. More deaths and injuries had been averted for two
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reasons. Firs~, many residents were not at home. Second, betwe~n
200-300 residents had heard the tornado warning and went to the
underground shelter located in the center of the trailer park.
They watched in horror as the tornado crushed their mobile homes.
The Golden Spur Mobile Home park sustained a direct impact from the
unusually large and powerful tornado. The police chief was in the
shelter watching his own home being destroyed. He was in constant
radio contact with the police station while the tornado worked its
destruction. Listening to recordings of his messages to police
headquarters provides a chilling indication of what the victims
were experiencing. The destruction was so massive and total that
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) certified the Andover
site as a federal disaster area.
Research Goal and Methodology
The Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information
Center's "Quick-Response Grant" program (University of Colorado)
supports research which is focused on questions best answered
through gathering data during the immediate post-impact period of
a disaster event. A three-person field team from the Social
Research Group (SRG), Department of Sociology and Anthropology,
Millersville University of Pennsylvania, was supported by such a
grant when it proceeded to the Andover site within 48 hours of
impact. The team sought to assess the extent to which media
reporting of the local emergency management agency (LEMA) response
to the event influenced the subsequent LEMA decisions. There is a
6
disaster resea~ch literature that notes the contribution made by
the media in warning the pUblic of an impending disaster and in
disseminating helpful recovery information (see, for example,
Drabek & Stephensen, 1971, for a discussion of the radio as a
warning source; and Quarantelli, 1980), but less is known about the
role of the media in influencing the behind-the-scenes LEMA
decision-making process.
The research director (faculty member) and two research
assistants (students) remained in the field for four days
functioning primarily as participant observers in the temporary
emergency operating center (EOC). The team informally interviewed
virtually every member of the EOC team, e.g., the mayor who served
as the emergency response coordinator, a county commissioner, city
council members, various city workers, police personnel, and so
forth. The field team also observed and interviewed several print
and broadcast media personnel who were working on news stories of
the event. The field team sought to gain an understanding of what
the EOC was attempting to coordinate and how they prioritized their
actions pursuant to meeting the needs and desires of their various
constituencies, e.g., victims, volunteers, city workers, and the
larger pUblic.
The members of the research team easily gained entree to the
EOC. The research director had spoken with one of the LEMA
personnel by telephone prior to leaving for the field. This LEMA
official was receptive to our research participation and indicated
that he would serve as our "sponsor." When we arrived in the field
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we asked for o~r contact and presented our credentials. The EqC
personnel invited our complete participation. In fact, we had to
make it clear that we were not there to advise, but merely to
observe and gather information that could be helpful to others as
they develop their future disaster plans. We functioned as
participant observers. We were free to enter and leave the EOC as
we wished. We observed virtually all EOC meetings during the four
days of our field work. We completed informal, one-on-one
interviews, during non-busy periods. The principal EOC personnel
were very candid about their situation, i.e., the problems they
were facing in trying to coordinate a response, their perceived
failures, their irritation at the media, and so forth. They were
very frank during their EOC meetings in discussing the details of
how they should respond to the media and various community
constituencies . The completeness of our entree became readily
apparent to us during our second and third days in the field when
they were openly discussing how they should react to the media's
blame-fixing--Iocal officials were coming under increasing
criticism in the broadcast and print media for allegedly not
adequately warning the Golden Spur residents.
An interview guide was committed to memory by the field team
members prior to entering the field. This informal guide contained
open-ended questions designed to obtain the respondent's
perspective of what problems they were encountering in responding
to the disaster, how these problems were being addressed, by whom,
and when. We asked the EOC personnel what they thought they would
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do differently.. (or similarly) should they face such a situation
again. We asked what individuals and what organizations were
involved in the response. And, we asked them to describe their
perspective on the media's activities in helping or hindering the
response process.
After entering the field and observing EOC activities, the
team realized the limited utility of the interview guide. We found
it far more useful to just observe every conversation, meeting, and
discussion that we COUld. We tried to inconspicuously take notes
to help us remember what happened and when it happened. We used
our tape recorders to dictate notes and to sometimes record
interviews. Most of our interviews became conversations which
helped us piece together the decisions made by the different
emergency organizations. We were trying to understand the
interactive decision-making process of this emergent (EOC) group.
We "interviewed" every member of the EOC team which was comprised
of personnel from local government agencies and volunteer
organizations. We also "interviewed" leaders and workers in
volunteer organizations which had no direct affiliation with the
EOC, e.g., the Mennonite Disaster Services, and we "interviewed"
personnel from local print and broadcast media organizations. We
completed a total of 32 "interviews" while in the field.
The field team obtained copies of the local newspapers
published during the first month of the post-impact and recovery
periods in order to determine types of stories and the slant of the
stories being published about the EOC's disaster response. While
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in the field, the team also video-taped news broadcasts of two of
the local television stations for the same purpose.
Did Media Reporting Influence EOC Decisions?
What We Found Upon Our Arrival. The field team presented its
credentials to the first local official we met upon entering the
EOC. After explaining who we were and why we were present, we were
accepted and given access to every activity taking place in the
EOC. We immediately assumed the role of observer. We conducted
interviews when possible. We had telephoned the EOC prior to
leaving for the field in order to facilitate entree. We found our
initial contact shortly after our arrival. The EOC personnel
appeared to be pleased to be of help to the research effort that
contributes to helping other communities as they plan for such
events.
The field team found the EOC located in an empty store front
in a small strip-mall adjacent to the destroyed mobile horne park.
The community did not have a written disaster plan. There is no
full or part-time local emergency preparedness coordinator. The
mayor emerged during the immediate post-impact period to function
as the coordinator of the city's response to the tornado. Various
other local elected officials emerged to function as a committee to
assist the mayor. Community, church, and volunteer organizations
converged to assist the elected officials in coordinating the
cleanup.
A temporary EOC was set up in an empty room of the vacant
10
store. The EOC contained a conference table with enough chairs
around it to seat approximately 15 people. A felt-tip writing
board was mounted on a wall on which information was written as it
became available, e.g., problems needing attention, names and phone
numbers of key personnel, the mayor's next scheduled press
conference. A typewriter, telephones, and eventually a television
and a photo-copying machine were installed. Almost everything in
the EOC, including the store it was housed in, were donated by
local businesses.
EOC security was maintained by the local police department
which numbered five uniformed police officers. within 36 hours of
impact a security badge system was in place. No one was allowed
into the EOC area without a security badge. A communications bus
was positioned directly in front of the store (EOC location). A
Red Cross Canteen was located in the parking lot near the
communications bus. Various additional volunteer organizations,
e.g., ham radio operators club, were working out of empty stores or
vehicles in the mall parking lot.
The destroyed trailer park was across the street from the mall
in which the EOC was located. Anyone from the EOC wishing to visit
the disaster site could simply walk to it within a few minutes.
The field team made numerous such trips. The National Guard was
onsite to prevent anyone who did not have a security badge from
entering the trailer park. They were called to Andover to "prevent
looting and to assist in traffic control." There was a problem
with converging sightseers clogging the roads. Search and rescue
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activities wer~ slowed due to this convergence. Residents who we:r;e
not home during impact as well as the relatives of victims or
survivors found it difficult to reach the site. And, volunteers
who were trying to assist sorting the debris for valuables were
also hindered by the convergence. The trucks carrying the bull-
dozed debris had a difficult time getting to and from the site.
Emergent Issues Reported in the Media
Debris Clearance. When we first arrived, the EOC personnel
were in the process of dividing into two separate camps of diverse
opinion in response to an emerging issue. When should clearance of
the trailer park begin? It had been less than 48 hours since
impact, but there were those who wanted to give the go-ahead to the
city engineer, his crew, and the crews donated by area businesses,
to initiate the clearance of the debris. The primary reason given
for starting the cleanup as soon as possible was that the
businesses which donated the bulldozer crews and equipment would
not be able to do without them indefinitely. Their withdrawal was
anticipated within days, especially if they were sitting idle. A
second reason, provided by the owner of the mobile home park, was
that the victims would not be able to obtain, install, and move
into new mobile homes in the park until the park was cleared of the
debris from the storm. Hence, the park owner and those personnel
charged with completing the clearance of the debris, lobbied the
EOC to keep the survivors out of the park so that the debris
clearance could be completed immediately.
Those opposing immediate action were concerned that the
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survivors need~d much more time to locate valuables that were among
the ruins, e.g., family photos and mementos. Members of this camp
made frequent visits to the trailer park to speak with the
surviving residents who were combing through the debris. These EOC
officials would return to relate the pleas and frustrations these
citizens expressed in asking for "a couple more days" to find their
irreplaceable keepsakes. Most local print and broadcast media
focused on reporting the extent of damage, the death and injuries,
the sources of help for victims, the types of aid needed, where to
send it, and the locations for volunteers to meet to help victims.
One local television station, however, and one local newspaper
focused on blame-fixing. [Blame assignation occurs more commonly
after technological disasters, but has been known to occur after
natural disasters such as tornadoes (Chandessers, 1966).] A
reporter from each of these repeatedly interviewed victims who were
very vocal about their frustration with the city's initial decision
to not allow them to return to their damaged or destroyed home to
obtain valuables and with the city's initial announcement that
debris clearance would begin shortly--before valuable salvaging
could be completed. The slant of the news stories of these
reporters essentially portrayed the EOC as being inconsiderate of
the needs of those they were supposed to serve. We are not taking
sides here, we are merely attempting to describe the roles assumed
by the principals as we have assessed the situation in the field.
The argument could certainly be made that the blame-fixing
reporters were doing the victims a service by taking up their
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cause. The p()int being made here is that we are not passirlg
jUdgment on who may be more right or more wrong, we are noting that
a conflict existed which pit the EOC against some in the media.
This conflict consumed a lot of time from the EOC personnel as they
planned how to respond to the mounting criticism where it appeared.
While the EOC was attempting to coordinate the community's response
to the disaster, it devoted much time to determining what it
considered the best response to this criticism. The debate over
when to complete the debris clearance continued throughout our four
days in the field. Deadlines for victims to finish their salvage
efforts were set daily, then pushed back as a result of complaints
by the victims and the media's portrayal of such complaints. The
clearance was finally set to begin the day the field team was
leaving town.
The Mennonite Disaster Services (MDS) also contributed to the
continual EOC "mind changing." Early each morning the MDS would
send a large crew to the trailer park to sift through the debris
\
for victims who were not present. The MDS operated separately from
the EOC and resisted virtually all efforts to bring them within the
coordination sphere of the EOC. The MDS essentially ignored any
decision by the EOC when it would indicate that search activities
would be discontinued to begin clearing the park. Between the
media's criticism and the MDS's ignoring of EOC decisions, it
became impossible to begin clearing the park. EOC personnel
realized any "strong arm tactics" to stop the MDS would only
further exacerbate the EOC's emerging pUblic relations problems.
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The field ,team concluded that it was obvious that the media's
involvement had a definite impact on the decision making of the EOC
personnel. It influenced how the EOC utilized its time. It also
influenced the EOC's decision as to when to begin the final phase
of the debris clearance. Virtually every EOC decision increasingly
became hostage to the desire to limit "media damage" as the need to
consider how the media might perceive (or misperceive) their
actions was of increasingly greater concern to them with each
negative press story.
Warnings. We also discovered, shortly after our arrival, that
both EOC camps were bristling at the emerging media blame-fixing
reports which were suggesting that the city did not do an adequate
job warning the trailer park residents about the tornado's
impending impact. Even though there was a difference of opinion
between the two camps in the EOC over when to initiate debris
clearance, there was total unanimity of resentment toward those in
the media who sought to criticize their pre-impact efforts.
Virtually all of the EOC personnel had no sleep in the 48 hours
since impact. They felt that they had been totally devoted to
doing the best job they could in coordinating the response to
facilitate the community's restoration to normal time activity. In
private conversations with the research team, some EOC personnel
suggested that maybe everything they had done before, as well as
since, impact may not have been perfect, but "we are only human
... had no prior experience, no written (disaster) plan, no prior
training, and are doing the best we can making this up as we go
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along." They j,ndicated that they were in frequent contact with.a
neighboring community that had recently experienced an emergency
event and had taken steps to be better prepared should they be a
target of a disaster again. The Andover EOC personnel were using
their neighboring community's emergency coordinators as consultants
in developing their own emergent response. Nevertheless, media
attention continued to focus on why the city, allegedly, did not
take adequate steps to warn the residents prior to impact.
The first such issue centered on criticism of the police
department's attempt to warn the mobile home residents by sending
a patrol car through the park neighborhoods sounding its siren.
The city stated that this procedure is standard operating procedure
during a tornado warning, a procedure that the community had
previously been educated to recognize through newspaper and
television reports. In other words, the citizens should have known
what the siren meant. From the city's perspective, they risked the
life of an officer to give the warning just minutes before impact.
From the point of view of those who criticized the police effort,
it was a meaningless effort. In the view of one survivor, "why not
at least use a bull horn to warn those who were walking on the
street?"
The EOC decided to release a video tape they had of the police
officer's effort. In response to the alledged beating of Rodney
King by Los Angeles police officers, Andover had mounted a video
camera on each police cruiser just weeks before the tornado struck
their community. City officials stated that these cameras were to
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be used to recprd arrests in order to provide evidence for drunk
driving offenses and to protect the police officer from false
charges of police brutality. By chance, the officer who sounded
the alarm in the mobile home park, had the video camera on,
inadvertently recording his attempt to warn the park residents.
The EOC decided to call a press conference in order to play the
video tape for the press as a strategy for reducing the criticism.
Many in the media saw it differently, however; they recoiled when
they watched the police officer drive past a resident who was
walking her dog--apparently unaware or unconcerned about the
impending disaster. They thought the officer should have stopped
to inform the resident of what the siren meant and tell her to seek
shelter. It was seen as quite possible that she could have had
time to get to the shelter if he had stopped. It is also quite
possible that a) she would have decided to not go to the shelter,
b) she may not have had enough time anyway, and/or c) the police
officer may have run out of time to save himself... and died.
A second criticism of the city I s alleged lack of adequate pre-
impact warning emerged. A debate raged around the question as to
whether or not the community (civil defense style) siren was
actually activated during the pre-impact period. The media and the
EOC personnel continued the debate throughout the post-impact
period. Many residents were quoted in the press as stating that
they did not hear a siren, some said that they had. An examination
of the siren found it to be non-functional. EOC personnel stated
that it had been inspected recently and had been found to have been
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in good working. order. The firm that had been employed to maintain
the siren was quoted as indicating that the siren had been left
unrepaired until funds could be found to purchase the expensive
parts it needed.
While the EOC was busy responding to the post-impact needs of
the trailer park, it was also spending a fair amount of time trying
to both respond to the media's investigation into the siren's
status and to attempt to limit the ill-will being generated in the
community by the media' s investigative reporting of this third
issue. To counter the increasing negative feelings being generated
in the community by the siren issue, the EOC decided to hold a
press conference at which they would answer questions and release
information which, they felt, would refute the perception that the
city had been irresponsible.
The field team concluded that it was obvious that the media's
reporting had an obvious impact on the actions taken by the EOC in
response to each of the three issues which emerged in the media
during the post-impact immediate recovery period. We want to
clearly repeat the we are not chastising either the media or the
EOC for actions taken. Our task was to determine if the decisions
made by the EOC personnel were influenced by the reporting in the
media during the immediate recovery period. As participant
observers who engaged in informal interviewing we sought to gather
qualitative data which would enable us to discern what was
occurring pursuant to our research goal. The short answer to the
question (Did the media's reporting influence the disaster response
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decisions made.by the emergency personnel in the aftermath of the
Andover tornado?) is: Yes!
Content of Media's Reporting
While the EOC was stung by the negative media reports, we
found most of the print and broadcast media reporting to have been
either supportive of their efforts or at least neutral. Most of
the reporting dealt with damage estimates, death tolls, human
interest stories about survivors, and so forth. The media was a
real asset as the primary or only source of disaster information
for the community (as observed, for example, by Wenger, 1980--
while Wenger's focus was quite different, the point is applicable
here). It was essentially one reporter from one of the television
stations and one reporter from one of the newspapers that focused
on the critical issues. Yet, while most of the reporting was
supportive of the EOC, much time and effort were devoted to
responding to those minority of instances where they received
negative press. Some EOC personnel became increasingly antagonist
toward anyone from the offending television station or newspaper
company. They also became increasingly distrustful of the media
generally.
For example Table 1, below, provides the results of our
content analysis of print and broadcast news reports on the
disaster. Please note that in the case of both the print and
broadcast media the ratio of negative reporting was less than one
in ten. Most television news stories (91%) were either positive or
19
neutral in repa~ting on disaster events and most newspaper accounts
(93%) were also either neutral or supportive of the efforts of the
EOC.
TABLE 1: TYPE OF REPORTING
Media Form
Broadcast Print
Reporting
supportive
critical
91% (120)
9% ( 12)
100% (132)
93% (141)
7% ( 10)
100% (151)
The reader should note, however, that while the Wichita area
has five television stations, plus cable news channel, the field
team was able to obtain video tapes of television news broadcasts
only while we were in the field. Furthermore, these taped
broadcasts came from only two of the television stations. It is
possible that the broadcasts of the other stations were
substantively different from those we recorded.
On the other hand, it was possible to obtain copies of the
major local newspaper and the local weekly newspaper for the month
following the date of impact. Hence, the content analysis of the
print media news stories of the event is more complete than that
for the broadcast media. We were able to include in our content
analysis those news reports that the EOC found offensive--and to
which their decisions were responsive.
Recovery. During the weeks that followed the disaster event,
the clearing of the park was subsequently completed. Rebuilding
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was begun and .. attempts were made to return the community to .. a
version of normal time activity. The media sought new stories and
the victims continued to struggle with what would be, for them, a
long term process of rebuilding their lives. Those local leaders
who comprised the post-tornado emergent EOC staff began a soul
searching process to assess what should be done to be better
prepared for any future disaster that they hoped would never visit
their community.
Literature Based Analysis , Discussion of the Findings
Researchers have long argued that disaster warnings must be
conceptualized as a social process (Williams, 1956; Mileti, 1975;
Mileti, Drabek, and Haas, 1975; Janis & Mann 1977; Quarantelli,
1980; Perry, 1985; Drabek, 1986). "The initial response to a
disaster warning is disbelief" (Drabek, 1986; see also, Drabek,
1969; Moore, et al., 1963; Fritz & Mathewson, 1957). If the
disaster event was unexpected, e.g., the case of a rapid onset
disaster agent such as a tornado, and if the level of emergency
preparedness is low, most people tend to continue in their normal
routine when first warned of an impending disaster, as they
disbelieve the warning whether it comes from an authority or not
(Perry, Lindell, & Greene, 1981; Quarantelli, 1980). If the
warning message appears to the listener as vague, their tendency to
disbelieve it is increased (Drabek, 1986 & 1968; Mileti, Drabek, &
Haas, 1975; Perry, et al., 1981; Fritz, 1957).
Several variables appear to increase the likelihood of a
warning being taken seriously and appropriately acted upon. These
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variables include the clarity of the warning message, i . e. ,
specificity of the nature of the hazard and what the listener is
directed to do in response to it (Perry, Lindell, & Greene, 1982);
the consistency of the warning message with other warning messages,
i.e., media, weather services, local authorities, family members
seem to all be giving the same warning message (Demerath, 1957;
Fritz, 1957; Mileti, Drabek, & Haas, 1975; Drabek, 1986); the
frequency of the warnings (Mileti, 1975; Fritz, 1961; Drabek &
Boggs, 1968; Drabek, 1969 & 1986; Perry, Lindell, & Greene, 1981);
the type of authority who is giving the message, e.g., the media is
believed more than the police or fire personnel, yet the
police/fire personnel are believed more than friends or family
(Perry & Greene, 1983; Drabek, 1969 & 1986; Mileti, 1975); the
accuracy of past warnings, i.e., if they accurately forecast the
disaster agents direction and impact (Mileti, Drabek, & Haas, 1975;
Haas, Cochrane, and Eddy, 1976; Foster, 1980; Drabek, 1986); and
the frequency of the disaster agent, e.g., if tornadoes frequently
strike the area (Drabek, 1986; Anderson, 1969).
During the pre-impact period, an attempt was made to warn the
residents of Andover of the impending tornado I s impact. First, the
community officials attempted to activate the civil-defense siren
system. It apparently failed to operate in the normal fashion.
Even if it had, it should be noted that Hodler (1982) studied the
response of the residents of a community to a tornado warning and
found that less than half of the affected residents who heard the
civil defense warning sirens sought a location of safety, even
22
though they we,re tested briefly on the first Saturday of each
month. Dependence on a siren system to move the population to
effectively respond to the warning of an impending impact is
thereby rendered suspect as an effective means of warning the
population.
The community utilized two additional medium to warn the
residents. First, radio and television stations broadcast the
tornado watch, then the warning for the Wichita-Andover area.
Because a tornado is a rapid-onset disaster agent, it is difficult
to expect the warning to provide sufficient time for the total
population to complete the social process of digesting, confirming,
and acting upon the warning prior to impact. As noted above, the
media has been found in the literature to be the most believed
source of disaster warning information and Wenger, James, and
Faupel (1980) found that most citizens tend to obtain their
information about disasters from the media. Furthermore, not all
residents of any community have a radio or television turned on
when such warnings are being given. This appeared to be the case
for many Andover residents. And, there remain the issues of
clarity, consistency, frequency, previous accuracy, and frequency
of tornadoes in the area. The broadcast messages were clear to the
extent that they indicated the nature of the threat, a tornado, and
the response the listener was being directed to follow, seek
appropriate shelter. As is the nature of the state of the art of
tornado forcasting, the path of the tornado and sUbsequent impact
area is vague enough to enable many listeners to assume that they
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will not be th~ actual target. Previous experience, even in ~n
area prone to tornadoes, tends to reinforce this perception of the
validity of the warning to many listeners. And, the opportunity to
broadcast frequent warnings is reduced by the rapid-onset of a
tornado, unlike the slow-onset generated opportunities a hurriance
provides for giving frequent warnings not only in the broadcast,
but also the print media.
The remaining attempt to warn the area was the attempt by the
Andover Police Department to alert the residents of the Golden Spur
Mobile Home Park by sending an officer to quickly drive up and down
the streets of the mobile home park with his siren activated as a
warning. When it became apparent to the city that this area was in
the direct path of the tornado, there were minutes to act. The
patrol car was dispatched to the park, the officer had less than 10
minutes to drive through the park and then return, at speeds
exceeding 80 miles per hour, to the station house shelter which was
approximately two miles from the park. If the officer had
attempted to go door to door to warn residents he would, in all
likelihood, have become a victim of the storm himself. Post-storm
criticism which suggested that the officer could have used a bull
horn to at least warn those who were milling outside their homes,
as well as the criticism which suggests that the residents "had
only themselves to blame since they did not heed the warnings,"
assume the clarity of vision that comes with hindsight. The
literature, as noted above, has observed the tendency for those who
even hear the warning to disregard it, unless the message is very
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clear, frequently given in a consistent message over time, which is
not undermined by previous experience where the warnings appeared,
to the listener, to be unnecessary. In the Andover experience, the
community is one which is generally exposed to the threat of
tornadoes, the appropriate authorties were sounding the alarm
(media and police personnel), and the message was clear. In fact,
we can account for the response of at least 388, perhaps 488 of the
Golden Spur Mobile Home Park residents. Between 200 and 300 of
them heeded the warning and went to the shelter in the park. They
were safe. Thirteen people died and 175 were injured. Presumably
these 188 individuals either did not hear the warnings or did not
heed them. We do not know the where abouts of the remaining
residents, between 512 and 612 individuals. Most, if not all of
them, were apparently not home at the time. Some of them heeded
the warning and left for safer locations out of the area, many had
not returned from work yet, others had gone out for the evening.
Apparently, few stayed in their mobile homes and walked away
unharmed. Hence, it appears that more than half of the residents
that we can account for, did respond to the warning. This is
better than what Hodler (1982, discussed previously) observed in
response to the warning of an impending tornado's impact in a case
study of another community. It appears, therefore, that the
Andover citizens behavior was very typical of what tends to occur
in response to disaster warnings. It also appears that the
response of the relevant community organizations, e.g., the media
and local government, was very typical in their attempts to warn
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the residents. Using civil-defense sirens, media warnings, and
police warnings are not unusual ways to attempt to allert the
citizenry and move them to act on behalf of their own safety.
If the Andover experience is not atypical of the research
literature, then why did we observe the blame assignation process
among local residents as reflected in the media? Drabek (1968)
notes that searches for "the guilty" do follow some disaster
events. Chandessais (1966) discovered that citizens do sometimes
use the town administration as the scapegoat during the aftermath
of a tornado. Singer (1982), similarly, observed a tendency to
direct blame toward civic officials. Wolensky and Miller (1981, as
reported in Drabek, 1986:293) noted "the generalized belief that
formal authorities in local government were [seen as] unresponsive
to the needs of specific citizens. . there existed a 'gap'
between what was expected and what was delivered. In response to
this, certain constituencies felt unprotected and ' forced' to
mobilize." Drabek and Quarantelli (1967, as reported in Drabek,
1986:292) suggest that such blame assignation may "help give the
illusion that corrective action of some sort is being taken."
While blame assignation is more likely to occur in conjunction with
a technological disaster than with one that is caused naturally
(Drabek & Quarantelli, 1967), the scapegoating experienced by the
Andover government officials during the post-impact and early
recovery periods was not, therefore, totally unprecedented.
The appropriate question to address presently seems to suggest
itself automatically: under what circumstances is a community
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likely to become more effective in responding to such disaster
events? Beyond those which have already been implied above,
several suggested by the literature will be offered below.
concluding Observations
What would Dorothy have found if she had returned home to
Kansas on that fateful Friday in April 1991? She would have found
a trailer park totally destroyed by an extremely large and powerful
tornado. She would have been pleased to find so many survivors
resulting from the 200-300 residents wisely heeding the warning and
evacuating to the underground shelter. She would have found a
divided, but earnest, EOC trying its best to respond to the events
that have befallen them, without a written disaster plan or
training to guide them in their decision-making. She would have
found a very well organized, very competent, if very independent,
group assisting the victims in their determination to find
irreplaceable possessions. And Dorothy would have found broadcast
and print media news stories which were often supportive of the
community 's attempts to recover from the tornado, yet she also
would have found stories which were critical of the town's
response. These latter stories were of sufficient concern to the
EOC as to influence their decision-making during the immediate
post-impact and early recovery periods.
Since Dorothy knows "there's no place like home," she would be
interested in suggesting how things could possibly be improved in
case another tornado comes to town. Therefore, the field team
27
offers several ~uggestionswhich are not meant to be critical, on~y
supportive as Andover and other communities seek to continue to
improve the service they give to their pUblic during time of
disaster.
Disaster Plan. A written disaster plan would assist present
and future individuals who find themselves with the unenviable task
of having to respond to a disaster agent's impact (see Drabek,
1986; Quarantelli, 1984; Dynes & Quarantelli, 1975; Dynes,
Quarantelli, & Kreps, 1972 for a discussion of the merits of such
planning). The process of constructing the written plan would be
of great benefit to the organizations who must respond to such
emergencies. other communities, the state emergency management
office, and FEMA would all be sources for guidance in developing
such a plan.
Community Education Effort. The local government could engage
in an ongoing effort to educate the community about the needs,
problems, and procedures associated with disaster events. For
example, school children could be taught the importance of
evacuating or seeking shelter when the community and/or police
siren is activated. Of course, additional warning activities could
be considered to facilitate gaining the awareness of community
members that an emergency is taking place.
Disaster Training & Drills. Those who are members of the EOC
would greatly benefit by attending training seminars. Such
training would not only give direction to the individual role
responsibilities, but should also give some direction in writing
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and updating a .. community's disaster plans. In addition to being
taught disaster response skills, regular disaster drills would test
the readiness of the individuals and their organizations. Drills
should benefit the community in assessing the adequacy of their
written disaster plan as well.
EOC Design. While it may not be economically feasible for
every community to maintain a permanent EOC, the disaster plan
could designate an emergent EOC structure which should alleviate
some of the trial-and-error decision making that accompanies
organizational response to a disaster. Even an EOC that does not
exist until a disaster strikes, needs some written guidelines which
outline what roles need to be fulfilled, what tasks commonly need
to be addressed in what order, and what problems can be expected to
arise during the life cycle of the recovery period. Of course, any
written plan is only useful if it is actually implemented.
Mutual Assistance Agreements. Perhaps the cooperation of
organizations such as the Mennonite Disaster Services could be
attained if the community developed and maintained, as part of
their implemented written disaster plan, a relationship with it
during normal time. The community and organizations like MDS could
mutually educate each other of their needs, procedures, and so
forth. If an emergency develops in the community, it would,
thereby, be in a better position to respond in concert with the
various organizations.
Developing a Relationship with the Media . Investigative
reporters may by definition view their role as adversarial. It is
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arguably good tpat.this is the case at times, since the Golden Sp~r
Mobile Home Park residents' desire to have more time to reclaim
their property was essentially fulfilled through the role the local
media played on their behalf. The rebuilding process can be hurt,
however, if local politics and personality clashes interfere with
EOC attempts to respond effectively. A good disaster plan, when
implemented properly, could assist those who would perform EOC
functions during emergency time, if it provides for mechanisms for
developing an effective relationship with key personnel in print
and broadcast media during normal time. The media could become
involved in the planning process and gain an understanding of the
valuable role they can play in assisting the local community as an
information disseminator during time of disaster. The media can be
a very valuable aid to a community struck by disaster. Life saving
information can be disseminated with the help of newspaper,
television, and radio reporters. If those who would fulfill EOC
roles during disaster time seek to educate those in the media as to
how they can give valuable assistance to the recovery effort, then
perhaps the emergency coordinators can devote more of their time to
the primary task of responding to the disaster rather than to the
media's criticism. By developing a working relationship with media
organizations, EOC personnel may gain insight into the most
effective approach to involving media personnel as team members who
are jointly attempting to serve the community rather than be
adversaries.
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